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FOREWORD
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to control damage from debris in the
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control measures a part of routine launch flows.
These measures include engineering surveillance during vehicle processing and closeout
operations, facility and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and photographic
analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, on-orbit, and landing provide significant
data in verifying proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addition to the
Kennedy Space Center Photo/Video Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center and Marshall
Space Flight Center are also included in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the
mission.
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Photo 1 : Launch of Shuttle Mission STS-67
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1.0 SUMMARY
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 28 February
1995. The detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39A and MLP-I also included the primary flight
elements OV-105 Endeavour (8th flight), ET-69 (LWT 62), and BI-071 SRB's. There were no
vehicle or facility anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded on 1 March 1995. There were no Launch Commit Criteria (LCC),
OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No IPR's were taken. Although the time of launch
(beginning of March, early morning) created the potential for ET acreage icing, warmer than
expected ambient temperatures precluded the formation of acreage icing. There were also no
protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
After the 01:38:13 a.m. (local) launch on 2 March 1995, a debris walk down of Pad 39A was
performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. There was no visual indication of a
stud hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. All the T-0 umbilicals operated properly.
Overall, damage to the launch pad was minimal.
A total of 119 films and videos were analyzed as part of the post mission data review. No vehicle
damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. Both northeast
and southwest GOX vent seals stuck momentarily to the External Tank nosecone topcoat during
seal deflation/retraction at T-00:02:30. A 1-inch by 1-inch piece of topcoat was pulled loose from
the northeast seal footprint area. This condition was acceptable for launch. No vapors were visible
exiting the L3D ARCS thruster when the wet paper cover tore during SSME ignition.
Orbiter umbilical camera films showed nominal separation of SRB's from the External Tank. On-
orbit crew handheld still photography showed no significant anomalies on the ET after separation
from the Orbiter.
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after retrieval. The number of MSA-2
debonds on both frustums was average. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing from areas where
BTA closeouts had been applied on the frustums, forward skirts, and aft skirts. The underlying
BTA was sooted in many of these areas indicating exposure to flight aeroheating.
Orbiter performance as viewed on landing films and videos during final approach, touchdown, and
rollout was nominal. Drag chute operation was also normal.
A post landing inspection of OV-105 Endeavour was conducted 18 March 1995 on runway 22 at
Dryden Flight Research Center/Edwards AFB. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 76 hits, of
which 13 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger. Based on these numbers and comparison to
statistics from previous missions of similar configuration, both the total number of hits and the
number of hits 1-inch or larger were less than average. The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total
of 47 hits, of which 11 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger. The majority of these damage
locations were confined to the aft center area. No hits were observed on the outboard elevons or
outboard wing areas. There were no unusually large debris hits. Many of the damage sites showed
signs of re-entry thermal erosion.
A brown discoloration was visible on the forward section of the left payload bay door. The area of
discoloration extended from the leading edge of the door aft to a location on the door
approximately above the waste water dump nozzles on the left side of the Orbiter. Also, red RTV
was exposed along the leading edge of the payload bay door in this area.
Orbiter post landing microchemical sample results revealed a variety of residuals in the Orbiter
window samples from the facility environment, SRB BSM exhaust, Orbiter TPS, and
paints/primers from various sources. These residual sampling data do not indica_ a single source
of damaging debris as all of the noted materials have previously been documented in post-landing
sample reports. The residual sample data showed no debris trends when compared to previous
mission data.
A total of seven Post Launch Anomalies, but no In-Hight Anomalies (IFA's), were observed
during the STS-67 mission assessment.
2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Debris/Ice/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for launch activities was conducted
on 28 February 1995 at 1530 hours. The following personnel participated in various team
activities, assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports contained in
this document.
,,.j
J. Tatum NASA - KSC
G. Katnik NASA - KSC
B. Davis NASA - KSC
R. Speeee NASA - KSC
B. Bowen NASA - KSC
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M. Valdivia LSOC - SPC
M. Jaime LSOC - SPC
R. Seale LSOC - SPC
J. Blue LOSC - SPC
W. Riehards LSOC - SPC
G. Fales LSOC - SPC
J. McClymonds ILl - Downey
K. Mayer RockweU LSS
M. Nowling MTI - LSS
S. Otto
C. Curtis
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Chief, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
DigitalImaging Systems,
Lead, Thermal Protection Systems
Infrared Scanning Systems
ET Thermal Protection Systems
Lead, ET Mechanisms/Structures
ET Mechanisms, Structures
Supervisor, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
Lead, ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ShuttleAerodynamics
Systems Integration
SRM Processing
MMSS- LSS ET Processing
MMMSS- LSS ET Processing
LSOC - SPC Safety
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3.0 LAUNCH
STS-67waslaunchedat 95:061:06:38:12.997GMT (01:38:13a.m.local)on2 March 1995.
V
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on
February 28, 1995, from 1630 to I740 hours. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39A and MLP-1
also included the primary flight elements OV-105 Endeavour (8th flight), ET-69 (LWT 62), and
BI-071 SRB's. There were no vehicle or facility anomalies.
Due to the Pad/ET range safety calibration coax cable (314W25) anomaly on STS-63, Suspect
PR ET-69-EL-0002 was taken to address the following concerns: proper routing/installation,
flight debris, ignition source, RF interference pickup, and electro-static discharge. Pad Electrical
Engineering worked TPS $70-1261-00-001-012 and verified the cable was properly installed per
drawing requirements. There is no significant flight debris concern for damaging Orbiter windows
or tiles due to cable location on the -Z side of the ET.
3.2 FINAL INSPECTION
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on I March 1995 from 2050 to
2205 hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No IPR's were
taken. Although the time of launch (beginning of March, early morning) created the potential for
ET acreage icing, warmer than expected ambient temperatures precluded the formation of acreage
ice. There were also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were:
T-3 Hours T-0 Launch
Wind Speed (knots):
Wind Direction (degrees):
Relative Humidity (percent):
Temperature (degrees F):
Dew Point (degrees F):
06 08
249 259
82 88
71 64
66 60
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to scan the
vehicle for unusual temperature gradients, particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed
scanners, and to obtain a random sampling of vehicle surface temperature measurements to
thermally characterize the vehicle.
3.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. The paper covers on RCS thrusters R3R
and R4R were wet. The L3D paper cover was completely saturated and wet. Moisture trails and
liquid drops were visible on the R1A thruster nozzle. Typical ice/frost accumulations were present
at the SSME #1 and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. An infrared scan revealed no unusual
temperature gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields.
3.4 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the fixed STI radiometers ranged from 70-73 degrees F. In
comparison, temperatures measured by the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEl)
ranged from 72-74 degrees F. All measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum
requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied by MTI was 65
degrees F, which was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F.
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3.5 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SUR.FICE' was run as a general comparison to
infrared scanner point measurements. The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost
accumulation on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
The Final Inspection Team observed light-to-moderate condensate, but no ice or frost
accumulations, on the LO2 tank. There were no TPS anomalies.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Typical ice/frost accumulation, but no unusual
vapor, was present on the ET umbilical carrier plate.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, but no ice or frost
accumulations, were present on the acreage.
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. A crack, 14-16 inches long by 1/2-inch
wide, was present in the -Y ET/SRB cable tray forward surface TPS. The presence of the crack
was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the LO2 feedline bellows and support brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost fingers on the separation
bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents were typical.
",.._j
Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. The LH2
feedline bellows were wet with condensate.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge
barrier top and outboard sides. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro canister and
plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost had formed on the aft pyro canister closeout bondline. No unusual
vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable replenish, and launch.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which were all acceptable for launch per
the NSTS-08303 criteria, consisted of four OTV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 documented a 14-16 inch long by 1/2-inch wide crack in the forward surface TPS
of the -Y vertical strut/ET-SRB cable tray.
Anomaly 002 documented ice/frost formations in the LO2 feedline support brackets and bellows.
Anomaly 003 documented ice/frost formations on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical purge vents and the
LI-L2 ET/ORB umbilical purge vents, recirculation line bellows, and purge barrier.
Anomaly 004 documented a 1-inch by 1-inch piece of ET nose cone topcoat adhering to the +Y
GOX vent seal during seal deflation/hood retraction.
3.6 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch (LCC
requiremen0.
t
No leaks were observed on either the LO2 or LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilieals, the GH2 vent line, or
the Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate (GUCP).
No dark spots or residue from the GOX seals were observed in the nosecone footprint area.

Photo 2 : Pad/ET Range Safety Calibration Coax Cable
Proper pre-launch configuration of RSS cable on STS-67 vehicle was verified at_er
18 inches of similar cable remained attached to External Tank aftcr STS-63 lit_off
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Photo 3"
Stress Relief Crack in -Y Vertical Strut TPS
8 ORIGINAL PAI_I_
COLOR PHO-I'UGRAPH
V
4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS and RSS was conducted on 2 March 1995 from 1.5
to 3.5 hours after launch.
No flight hardware or TPS materials were found.
South SRB HDP erosion was typical. All south HDP shoe EPON shim material was intact. There
was no visual indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. All of the north
HDP doghouse blast covers were in the closed position. Erosion of the blast covers was minimal.
Minor damage to the SRB aft skirt purge lines and T-0 umbilicals was similar to previous
launches.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm (OAA), and GOX vent hood appeared
undamaged.
The GH2 vent line appeared to have latched properly with no rebound on the eighth tooth of the
latching mechanism. Slack in the static retract lanyard was not excessive. A loose GUCP pyro
bolt firing line will be secured for subsequent launches.
Typical, pad damage included:
2-foot by 2-foot metal cover was missing from a storage box on the FSS 95 foot
level south side.
6-foot crack in the MLP deck plating just north of the RH SRB exhaust hole to the
camera E- 15 support
3-inch diameter casting halves and 1.75-inch diameter washer on the GUCP
latchback level and the access platform below.
30 feet of permanent hand rail on the east side of the pad surface were bent at a
45 degree angle away from the SRB exhaust hole
Debris inspections of the pad acreage and flame trench were completed on 3 March 1995. No
flight hardware or new pad damage was found.
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 9.
V
Photo 4" ET Nose Cone Topcoat Adhered to GOX Vent Seal
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Photo 5 : South Holddown Post Shoe/EPON Shim
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5.0 FILM REVIEW
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the Mission Management Team,
Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems engineers. No IPR's or IFA's were generated as a result of
the film review. Post flight anomalies are listed in Section 9.
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 104 films and videos, which included thirty-nine 16mm films, twenty 35mm films, four
70ram films, and thirty-eight videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
No vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission.
Both northeast and southwest GOX vent seals stuck momentarily to the External Tank noseeone
topcoat during seal deflation/retraction at T-00:02:30. A 1-inch by 1-inch piece of topcoat was
pulled loose from the northeast seal footprint area. This condition was acceptable for launch
(OTV 060).
The dark object moving toward the SSME exhaust hole at 06:38:08.650 GMT was most likely an
insect or small piece of debris near the camera lens (E-2).
SSME ignition appeared normal (OTV 051,070, 071). Free burning hydrogen had drifted under
the body flap and upward to the base heat shield/OMS pods during start-up (OTV 063,070, 071).
Numerous (at least seven) flares occurred in the SSME #1 plume during startup (E-2, -3). One
typical flare occurred at 06:38:10.698 GMT (E-19).
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the centerline area between the SSME
cluster occurred during engine start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous
launches (E-76).
A small piece of tile surface coating material was lost from a base heat shield tile outboard of
SSME #3 (E-5, -6, -19, -25). Small pieces of tile surface coating material were also lost from base
heat shield tiles on the -Z side of SSME #3 (1 place) and outboard of SSME #2 (1 place)
(E-17, -18).
No vapors were visible exiting the L3D ARCS thruster when the wet paper cover tore during
SSME ignition (E-18).
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice to fall from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. Some pieces
of ice contacted the umbilical cavity sill and were deflected outward, but no tile damage was
visible. One large piece of ice fell from the LH2 recirculation line bellows (OTV 009, 063,064).
Smoke from the RH SRB hydraulic power unit rose upward along side the aft segment and drifted
eastward prior to liftoff (OTV 060, 063; TV-4A).
The External Tank "twanged" approximately 33 inches during SSME ignition (E-79).
The Orbiter LH2 and LO2 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and retracted properly (OTV 049, 050; E-
l 7, -18). GUCP disconnect from the External Tank appeared nominal (OTV 004, 067). The RSS
checkout coax cable pulled away from the connector properly (E-33). GH2 vent line retraction
and latch were normal (OTV 060). Some slack occurred in the static retract lanyard such that the
cable rebounded and contacted the GUCP base support bracket. The 3/8-inch quick-disconnect
was still venting residual purge gas during vent line retraction (E-41, -42, -48).
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No stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. No ordnance fragments Or frangt_ble
nut pieces fell from any of the DCS/stud holes. All north holddown posts doghouse blast covers
closed normally (E-7 - E-14). SRB RSS coax cables disconnected properly from the aft skirts
near HDP #2 and #8 (E-8, -14).
A partstag fellthrough the fieldof view insidethe LH2 TSM afterthe door closed(E-22).
Several pieces of ice, which appeared to originate from the LO2 feedline lower bellows, fell aft
without contacting Orbiter files (OTV 054). At least five pieces of ice from the LO2 feedline
upper bellows were shaken loose by SSME ignition. One piece rebounded off the Orbiter right
wing lower surface, but no file damage was visible (OTV 061).
Condensate/water streamed aft from the area of the rudder/speed brake split until the vehicle
cleared the tower (E-52).
A flash occurred in the SSME #1 plume at T+6 seconds MET as the vehicle cleared the tower.
Another large flash was visible at T+8.5 seconds MET (OTV 041; E-52, -57, -224).
Numerous particles fellout of the RH SRB plume after the roll maneuver in the general time
frame T+14 seconds MET (E-57, -59). A piece of hydrogen detection paper from the outboard
side of the +Y vertical strut fell aft at 06:38:24.820 GMT (E-57; TV-13).
Numerous pieces of ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier material and RCS thruster paper covers fell
aft during ascent. The largest pieces of purge barrier material were visible at T+23 and 48 seconds
MET (E-212, -213, -220, -222, -224). The large piece of ET/ORB purge barrier material falling
aft of the vehicle at T+48 seconds MET was also visible in film items E-204 and E-218.
A large flash occurred in the SSME #2/#3 plumes at T+24 seconds MET (TV-21A). Two flares
occurred in the SSME #2/#3 plume during ascent (E-213; E218 frame 930). A third flare was
observed in the SSME #1 Math diamond at 38:31"150 GMT (E-220, -222).
Body flap movement (amplitude and frequency) was similar to previous flights (E-208, -212,
-220).
A white object, possibly a FRCS paper cover, fell aft past the base of the vertical stabilizer in films
E-223, frame 5268 and E-218, frame 4976.
Thermal curtaintapewas looseon both RH and LH SRB aftskirthermal curtains(E-212).
Numerous smallpiecesof SRB propellantor aftskirtinstafoamdropped out of the SRB exhaust
plume at 68-81 seconds MET (TV-5).
An optical phenomenon, similar to the vapor cloud formed by the vehicle passing through a layer
of moisture on previous flights, occurred at 106 seconds MET (TV-2).
ET aft dome charring was typical. Exhaust plume recirculation, SRB plume tailoff and separation
appeared normal. Numerous pieces of slag, some large in size, dropped out of the SRB exhaust
plume before, during, and after SRB separation - a common event (TV-4A, -13; E-204, -205,
-208, -212, -220, -223, -224). The pieces appeared especially large in film item E-204 due to
"blooming" and image "smearing".
V
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Photo 6 : Flash in SSME Mach Diamonds
Momcntary orange-colored flash in the SSME roach diamonds is believed to be caused by
contaminants in the liquid propellants or in the main engine combustion chamber. Mach diamonds
are normally light blue in color.
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Photo 7 : Flares in SSME Plume
Typical flares observed in the main engine plume during ascent are caused by debris,
such as pieces of RCS paper covers, TPS, purge barrier material, falling into the plume.
?H
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-......J 5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
DTO-0312 was performed by the flight crew. Thirty-seven hand-held 35mm still images were
obtained of the External Tank after separation from the Orbiter.
OV-105 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: 16mm motion picture with 5 mm lens; 16mm
motion picture with 10mm lens; 35ram still views. Data was obtained during SRB flight and
separation. However, no data was obtained of the External Tank after separation from the Orbiter
due to the night launch (no light source).
No vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have been a safety of flight
concern.
Solid Rocket Booster separation from the External Tank was nominal.
The BSM bum scars on the LO2 tank were typical. No anomalies were observed on the
nosecone, PAL ramps, RSS antennae, flight door, LO2 feed line, and aft hard point. Erosion of
the manhole cover closeouts and aft dome apex was also typical.
Three divots were present in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout -Z side.
Both bipod jack pad closeouts appeared to be intact. The light spot outboard of the -Y bipod
spindle housing closeout is a prevaous repair/sanded area.
The LO2 and LH2 tank acreage TPS was in good condition.
16
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Photo 8 : Charred Hydrogen Fire Detection Paper
Dark object (arrow) was most likely a charred piece of the Hydrogen Fire Detection Systcm paper
attached at various locations around the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. Erosion/charring of TPS on the
aft surfaces of the -Y vertical strut and ET/ORB cable tray was typical.
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sPhoto 9 : Nominal SRB Separation from External Tank
Charting and erosion of the TPS on the aft surfaces of the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical cable tray and
-Y vertical strut was typical. Pockets of vapor aft of the ET aft dome werc caused by exhaust
plume recirculation.
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\Photo 10 : ET After Separation from Orbiter
View of External Tank after Orbiter separation shows acreage TPS in good condition with no
significant divots. Note ascent aerohcating scorch marks on the nose cone, around the forward
EB fittings, on the aft dome, and around the aft hardpoint. BSM burn scars on the LO2 tank
barrel section were typical.
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Photo 11 : View of ET +Y+Z Quadrant
Acreage TPS was in good condition with no significant divots. No anomalies were observed
on the nose cone, PAL ramps, bipods, LH2 tank-to-intcrtank flange closeout, or LO2 feedline
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-.._j 5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
Seven 16ram films, three 35ram large format films, and one video of landing were reviewed.
Orbiter performance on final approach appeared normal. There were no anomalies when the
landing gear was extended. The right main landing gear tires contacted the runway twice before
the LH MI, G touched down. Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth.
The drag chute was deployed after the nose gear contacted the runway in order to complete a
cross wind DTO. Drag chute deployment appeared nominal. No contact between drag chute risers
and vertical stabilizer/stinger tiles was observed. Two pieces of black material, which are made of
Teflon cloth and used in packing of the chute to prevent abrasion, came loose during chute
deployment and fell to the runway.
Rollout and wheel stop were uneventful. No large tile damage sites were visible on the Orbiter
lower surface. A brown discoloration was visible on the left payload bay door panel # 1. No ice or
visible deposits adhered to the payload bay door.
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
The BI-071 Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at
CCAFS Hangar AF on 6 March 1995. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in good
condition.
6.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The RH frustum was missing no TPS (Figure 1). The number of debonds over fasteners was
average. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing along the XB-395 ring frame where BTA had been
applied. Some of the underlying BTA was sooted. The BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in
the fully opened position.
The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic
base plates were intact. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where the BTA had
been applied. No pins were missing from the frustum severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were generally in good condition. A 4.2-inch
by 1.8-inch crack along the forward edge of the forward field joint closeout 305 degree location
appeared clean (unsooted) and was most likely the result of a post flight event, such as water
impact or handling. Trailing edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to
debris resulting from severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. A 7-inch by 2-inch piece of K5NA was
missing from the separation plane of the upper strut fairing. The substrate was lightly sooted. The
ETA ring, IEA, and IEA covers appeared undamaged. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate
closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring exhibited typical delamination. MSA-2 was missing from
aft skirt acreage in seven places. Most of the MSA-2 divots, which averaged 3-inches by 3-inches
in size, appeared to expose lightly-sooted substrate. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the
areas where BTA had been applied. The HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were
seated and appeared to have functioned properly.
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Figure I : RH SRB Frustum
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Photo 12 : RH Frustum
The number of debonds over fasteners was average. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing along
the XB-395 ring frame where BTA had been applied. Some of the underlying BTA was sooted.
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Photo 13 : RH Forward Skirt
The RH forward skirt exhibited no dcbonds or missing TPS. Hypalon paint was
blistered/missing over the areas where the BTA ¢loseouts had been applied.
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lk._j Photo 14 : RH Aft Booster/Aft Skirt
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Photo 15 : RH SRB Aft Skirt
MSA-2 was missing from aft skirt acreage in seven places. Most of the MSA-2 divots, which
averaged 3-inches by 3-inches in size, appeared to exposc lightly-sooted substratc. Hypalon paint
was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA closcouts had been applied.
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6.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The LH frustum was missing one 4-inch by 3-inch piece of TPS over three fasteners on the
XB-381 ring frame between the +Y/+Z axes. The exposed substrate did not appear sooted. The
number of MSA-2 debonds over fasteners was average (Figure 2). Hypalon paint was
blistered/missing along the XB-395 ring frame where BTA had been applied. Some of the
underlying BTA was sooted. The BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened
position.
The LH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic
base plates were intact. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA had been
applied. No pins were missing from the frustum severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good condition. In general, minor
trailing edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. A 5-inch by 1.5-inch piece of K5NA was
missing from the separation plane of the upper strut fairing. The substrate was lightly sooted. The
ET/SRB aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, IEA covers, and stiffener tings appeared undamaged. The
stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring exhibited typical delamination. Aft skirt acreage TPS was
generally in good condition. However, a 2-inch by 1/4-inch gouge in the MSA-2 near the
XB-1894 ring frame at the -Z axis between HDP #7 and #8 appeared to reach substrate. Hypalon
paint was blistered over areas where BTA had been applied. The HDP Debris Containment
System (DCS) plungers were seated and appeared to have functioned properly.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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Figure 2 : LH SRB Frustum
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£Photo 16 : LH Frustum
The number of MSA-2 dcbonds over fasteners was average. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing
along the XB-395 ring frame whcrc BTA c]oseouts had bcen applied. Some of the underlying
BTA was sooted.
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Photo 17 : LH Forward Skirt
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Photo 18 : LH Aft Booster/Aft Skirt
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L7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing debris inspection of OV-105 (Endeavour) was conducted 18-20 March 1995 at the
Dryden Flight Research Center/Edwards AFB on runway 22 and in the Mate-Demate Device.
This inspection was performed to identify debris impact damage and, if possible, debris sources.
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 76 hits, of which 13 had a major dimension of 1-inch or
larger. This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME
vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics
from 52 previous missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23, 25, 26, 26R, 27R,
30R, and 42, which had damage from known debris sources), indicates both the total number of
hits and the number of hits 1-inch or larger were less than average (Figures 3-6).
The following table breaks down the STS-67 Orbiter debris damage by area:
HITS > 1" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface 11 47
Upper surface 1 10
Right side 0 1
Left side 1 2
Right OMS Pod 0 4
Left OMS Pod 0 12
TOTALS 13 76
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 47 hits, of which 11 had a major dimension of
1-inch or larger. The majority of these damage locations were confined to the aft center area. No
hits were observed on the outboard elevons or outboard wing areas. There were no unusually
large debris hits. Many of the damage sites showed signs of re-entry thermal erosion.
No tile damage from micrometeorites or on-orbit debris have been identified to date.
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-1, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned properly and the debris shutters
were closed. All ET/Orbiter umbilical separation ordnance retention shutters were closed.
However, a 1/2-inch long metal female connector pin was found on the runway below the LO2
ET/ORB umbilical. There was no evidence that the part came from any of the electrical monoball
connectors. No significant amounts of foam or red purge seal adhered to the LH2 ET/ORB
umbilical near the 4-inch flapper valve.
Tires and brakes were reported to be in excellent condition. A loose, unidentified washer was
found in the inboard side of the left nose landing gear assembly. The washer was 1/2-inch in
diameter and gold in color.
The number of tile damage sites on the base heat shield was less than usual. Tiles on the vertical
stabilizer "stinger" and around the drag chute door were intact and undamaged. The Dome
Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets on all three SSME's were intact. Minor fraying
occurred on the SSME #1 blanket at the 12, 4, and 6 o'clock positions. The experimental TUFI
tiles located on the triangular carrier panel between and below SSME #2 and #3 appeared to have
sustained only one small impact.
A short section of Inconel thermal barrier located on the lower aft inside edge of the left speed
brake was damaged. Two tiles adjacent to the thermal barrier were also damaged.
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Orbiterwindows #3 and #4 exhibit_ heavy hazing and streaks. Only a light haze was present on
the other windows. Surface wipes will be taken from all windows for laboratory analysis. Tile
damage around the Orbiter windows was less than usual. Window streaking and tile damage in
this area are attributed to impacts from FRCS paper covers and/or paper cover RTV.
A tile located on the top of the fuselage just aft of window # 1 was missing a comer piece, which
measured 2-1/2 inches by 2 inches by the tile thickness. This did not appear to be a debris impact,
but may have been a debris source.
No ice adhered to the payload bay door. There was no unusual tile damage on the leading edges
of the OMS pods and vertical stabilizer.
A brown discoloration was visible on the forward section of the left payload bay door. The area of
discoloration emended from the leading edge of the door aft to a location on the door
approximately above the water dump nozzles on the left side of the Orbiter. Also, red RTV was
exposed along the leading edge of the payload bay door in this area. Samples from the discolored
area were taken for chemical analysis.
The drag chute appeared to have functioned normally. All drag chute hardware was recovered.
Runway 22 had been swept/inspected by Air Force personnel prior to landing and all potentially
damaging debris was removed.
The post landing walkdown of Runway 22 was performed immediately after landing, and several
times thereafter by both Air Force and NASA personnel. No flight hardware was found on the
runway.
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits and the number of hits 1-inch or
larger was less than average when compared to previous missions (Figures 7-8). From a debris
standpoint, the total number of hits was the lowest in the last 30 flights. The type of TPS damage
was typical and not attributable to any single debris source.
Orbiter Post Launch Debris Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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Figure 3 : Orbiter Lower Surface Debris Map
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Figure 4 : Orbiter Right Side Debris Map
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side thrusters
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Liquid dump vent
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Figure 5 : Orbiter Left Side Debris Map
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Figure 6 : Orbiter Upper Surface Debris Map
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LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE
HITS > I INCH TOTAL HITS HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS
S TS-6 21 89 36 120
S TS-8 3 29 7 56
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58
STS-11 (41-B) 11 19 34 63
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36
STS-14 (41-D) 10 44 30 111
STS-17 (41-G) 25 69 36 154
STS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81
STS-27 (51-1) 21 96 33 141
S TS-28 (51-J) 7 66 17 111
STS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34 183
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193
STS-29 18 100 23 132
STS-28R 13 60 20 76
S TS-34 17 51 18 53
STS-33R 21 107 21 118
STS-32R 13 111 15 120
STS-36 17 61 19 81
STS-31R 13 47 14 63
STS-41 13 64 16 76
STS-38 7 70 8 81
STS-35 15 132 17 147
STS-37 7 91 10 113
STS-39 14 217 16 238
STS-40 23 153 25 197
STS-43 24 122 25 131
STS-48 14 100 25 182
STS-44 6 74 9 101
STS-45 18 122 22 172
STS-49 6 55 11 114
S TS-50 28 141 45 184
STS-46 11 186 22 236
STS-47 3 48 11 108
STS-52 6 152 16 290
STS..53 11 145 23 240
STS-54 14 80 14 131
STS-56 18 94 36 156
STS-55 10 128 13 143
STS-57 10 75 12 106
STS-51 8 100 18 154
S TS-58 23 78 26 155
STS-61 7 59 13 120
S TS-60 4 48 15 106
8TS-62 7 36 16 97
STS-59 10 47 19 77
8T8-65 17 123 21 151
8TS-64 18 116 19 150
STS-68 9 59 15 110
S TS-66 22 111 28 148
STS-63 7 84 14 125
AVERAGE 14.1 90.5 21.2 131.4
SIGMA 7.3 42.8 10.0 55.0
ISTS-67 11 47 13 76J
MISSIONS STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 3OR, AND 42 ARE NOTINCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSI
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURC
Figure 7 : Orbiter Post Flight Debris Damage Summary
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Photo 19 : Overall View of Orbiter Right Side
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Photo 20 : Overall View of Orbiter Left Side
Note discoloration on leading edge of left payload bay door
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Photo 21 : LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical
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Photo 22 : LH2 ET/ORB Umbilical
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Photo 23 : Washer in Nose Wheel
A loose, unidentified washer was found in the inboard side of the left nose landing gear
wheel assembly. The washer was l/2-inch in diameter and gold in color.
45
| IORIG,NAL PAGE
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
V
Photo 24 : Base Heat Shield
Base heat shield tilcs and SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield closeout blankets
wcrc in good condition
46
OR1GINAL PAGE
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH

',,.._j
Photo 25 : Speed Brake Thermal Barrier
A short scction of lnconel thermal barrier located on the lower at_ inside edge
of the left rudder/speed brake was damaged
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Photo 26 : Speed Brake Tile Damage
A section of lnconcl thcrmal barrier and two adjacent tiles located on the
lower aft insidc edgc of thc left rudder/speed brake were damagcd
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Photo 27 : Orbiter Windows
Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited heavy hazing and streaks. Only a light hazc was prcscnt
on thc other windows. Tile damagc around the Orbitcr windows was less than usual.
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Photo 28 : Payload Bay Door Discoloration
A brown discoloration was visible on the forward section of the left payload bay door. The area of
discoloration extcndcd from the leading cdgc of the door aft to a location on the door
approximately above the water dump nozzles on the lcf_ side or the Orbiter. Also, red RTV was
exposed along the leading cdgc of the payload bay door in this area and may have contributed to
the discoloration.
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Photo 29 : Waste Water Dump Nozzles
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8.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS
A total of eight samples were obtained from OV-105 Endeavour during the STS-67 post landing
debris assessment at Dryden Flight Research Center, California. The submitted samples consisted
of 8 wipes from Orbiter windows #1-8. The samples were analyzed by. the NASA KSC
Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) for material composition and comparison to known STS
materials. Debris analysis involves both the placing and the correlating of particles and residues
with respect to composition, thermal (mission) effects, and availability. Debris sample
results/analyses are listed by Orbiter location in the following summaries.
8.1 ORBITER WINDOWS
Samples from the Orbiter windows indicated exposure to facility environment, SRB BSM exhaust
(metallic particulate), landing site materials (earth minerals), Orbiter Thermal Protection System
(tile, tile repair, and glass insulation), paints and primer from various sources, and Orbiter window
polish residue (cerium oxide). There was no apparent vehicle damage related to these residuals.
8.2 ORGANIC ANALYSIS
The results of the STS-67 organic analysis are pending.
8.3 NEW FINDINGS
This set of post-flight debris residual samples led to no new findings, although the variety of.
residual material continues to be representative of that documented in previous mission sampling
(Reference Figure 9).
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Figure 9 : Orbiter Post Landing Microchemical Sample Results
53
cO
co
o
E
o
¢0
E
to
.2
m
V
V
9.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/video review, seven post launch anomalies, but no In-
Flight Anomalies (IFA's), were observed on the STS-67 mission.
9.1 LAUNCH PAD/SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY
1. No items.
9.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
1. Hypalon paint on both frustums and forward skirts was blistered/missing where BTA closeouts
had been applied. Some of the underlying BTA was sooted indicating the Hypalon paint had been
exposed to flight aero heating. Rather than take an IFA at this time, program management
requested continued surveillance.
9.3 EXTERNAL TANK
1. Both northeast and southwest GOX vent seals stuck momentarily to the External Tank
nosecone topcoat during seal deflationflaood retraction at T-00:02:30. A 1-inch by 1-inch piece of
topcoat was pulled loose from the northeast seal footprint area. This condition was acceptable for
launch.
9.4 ORBITER
1. All ET/Orbiter umbilical separation ordnance retention shutters were closed. However, a 1/2-
inch long metal female connector pin was found on the runway below the LO2 ET/ORB
umbilical. There was no evidence that the part came from any of the electrical monoball
connectors.
2. A short section of Inconel thermal barrier located on the lower aft inside edge of the left speed
brake was damaged. Two tiles adjacent to the thermal barrier were also damaged.
3. A tile located on the top of the fuselage just aft of window # 1 was missing a corner piece,
which measured 2-1/2 inches by 2 inches by the tile thickness. This did not appear to be a debris
impact, but may have been a debris source.
4. A brown discoloration was visible on the forward section of the left payload bay door. The
area of discoloration extended from the leading edge of the door aft to a location on the door
approximately above the water dump nozzles on the left side of the Orbiter. Also, red RTV was
exposed along the leading edge of the payload bay door in this area.
5. A loose, unidentified washer was found in the inboard side of the left nose landing gear wheel
assembly. The washer was 1/2-inch in diameter and gold in color.
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STS-67 (OV-105): FILM / VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING
SUMMARY
SCREENING ACTIVITIES
Launch
Endeavour (OV-105) launched on mission STS-67 from Pad A at 06:38:12.998
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) on March 2, 1995 (day 61) as seen on camera
E9. Solid rocket booster (SRB) separation occurred at 06:40:18.062 UTC, as seen
on camera E208.
Twenty-four videos were screened on launch day. Following launch day, 54 films
were reviewed. Camera E62 was a no run. No anomalies were observed during
launch.
Detailed Test Objective (DTO) 312 (photography of the external tank after
separation) was performed for this mission using the Orbiter umbilical well
cameras and a handheld Nikon camera with a 300 mm lens and 2x extender. A
detailed description of DTO-312 is given in Section 2.4.
On Orbit
No On-Orbit tasks were performed for this mission.
Landing
Endeavour landed on runway 22 at Edwards Air Force Base on March 18, 1995
(day 77). Five videos of the Orbiter's approach and landing were reviewed.
NASA Select, which uses multiple views in real-time, was also reviewed. The
view from the helicopter was not received. Ten landing films were received and
reviewed. The right main gear touchdown (observed to touchdown twice), the left
main gear touchdown, and nose gear touchdown were all normal. Significant
landing timing events are given in Table 1.2.2.
No major anomalies were noted in any of the approach, landing and rollout video
and film views screened. Two white vapor puffs were seen aft of the vehicle at
21:42:49.681 and 21:42:54.032 UTC (camera LRO2). Contrails were seen
coming from both wing tips beginning at 21:45:11.469 UTC (camera LRO1).
The deployment of the drag chute appeared as expected. The drag chute event
times are given in Section 2.5.2.
The following items were noted during the post landing walk around inspection:
a brown discoloration near the left forward nose RCS thrusters, possible missing
pieces from the rim of the LH2 umbilical EO-2 fitting, white substance (possibly
RTV) near the 4" recirculation line connect, a small unidentified metallic
appearing object on the ground under the Orbiter, slight fraying of the Dome
Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) blankets, slight TPS erosion on the SSME base
heat shield, a tile chip on the right main landing gear door, and a tile chip on the
door of the nose gear (starboard aft upper comer).
V
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Figure 1.1.3: Discoloration on the Payload Bay Door
A brown colored discoloration on the forward section of the left payload bay door
and a white substance around the waste water dump nozzle were noted during the
post landing walk around inspection.
TIMING ACTIVITIES
l_ztunch:
All videos had timing. Film cameras: E1 through E20, E25, E26, E30, E31, E33
through E36, E40, E50, E52, E54, E57, E59, E60, E65A, E79A, E222, and E224
had in-frame alphanumeric timing. Camera E213 did not have timing. Time
codes from the launch videos and films were used to identify specific events
during the screening process.
Event Description Time (UTC) Camera
Launch
Body Flap Motion - Start
Body Flap Motion - End
Recirculation - Start
Recirculation - End
SRB Separation
061:06:38:12.998 E9
061:06"39:00.926 E212
061:06:39:04.045 E212
061:06:39:45.607 E204
061 :( E204
061:06:40:18.062 E208
Table 1.2.1: Launch Film Timing Events
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Landing:
Five videos were received on landing day and were screened.
DTV 1, DTV2, DTV3, LRO 1 and LRO2 had timing.
Event Description Time (UTC)
The five videos:
Camera
Landing gear - doors opened
Touchdown
Right Main Wheel (First)
Right Main Wheel (Second)
Left Main Wheel
Nose Wheel
Wheel stop
Table 1.2.2:
077:21:46:40.200
077:21:46:59:010
077:21:47:00.530
077:21:47:00.605
077:21:47:14:130
077:21:47:59.031
Landing Timing Events
El005
E1005
E1005
DTV3
El008
DTV1
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2.1.1.1
2.1.1.2
2.1.2.2
2.1.3
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
DEBRIS
Debris Near the Time of SSME Ignition
LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter Umbilical Disconnect Debris
(Cameras: El, E5, E6, El5, E16, El7, E25, E26, E30, E31, E35, E36, E40, E52,
OTV009, OTV054 and OTV063)
Normal ice debris were noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter umbilical
disconnect areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. None of the debris were
observed to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
Debris at T-1.9 Seconds
(Camera: E9)
A single piece of light colored debris (probably ice) was seen falling along the
right side of the RSRB at 1.9 seconds prior to lifloff. The debris did not appear to
strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
Debris Near the Time of SRB Ignition
SRB Flame Duct Debris
(Camera: E7, E8, E9, El0, E11, El2, El3, El4, El6, E52 and E213)
As on previous missions, debris were noted originating from the SRB flame duct
area after SRB ignition. The majority of the pieces of debris were seen near the
holddown posts. A single piece of light colored debris (probably from the SRB
flame duct) was seen north of the mobile launch platform (MLP) at liftoff. None
of the SRB flame duct debris was seen to contact the vehicle. No follow-up
action was requested.
LH2 and LO2 Tail Service Mast (TSM) T- 0 Umbilical Disconnect Debris
(Cameras: E2, El7, El8, El9, E20, E36, E76, E77, OTV049, OTV050,
OTV051, OTV063, and OTV070)
Normal ice debris were noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM T-0 umbilical
disconnect areas at liftoff. None of the pieces of debris were observed to strike
the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
Debris After Liftoff
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the Shuttle Launch Vehicle
(SLV) at liftoff, throughout the roll maneuver and beyond on the launch tracking
views. Most of the debris were probably reaction control system (RCS) paper or
ice from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. No follow-up action was requested.
V
V
STS-67 JSC Summary Report A8
2. STS-67 (OV-105): Summary of Significant Events
2.1.3.1 Debris at 1.5 Seconds MET
(Cameras: E34 and E35)
Figure 2.1.3.1: Debris along the Undcrsidc of thc Orbiter at Liftoff
A small piece of white debris fi'om the forward external tank area appeared to
contact the underside of the Orbiter at liftoff (1.5 seconds MET). No damage to
the Orbiter was seen. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.3.2 Debris at 3.0 Seconds MET
(Camera: E34)
A single light colored piece of debris was seen falling from the top of the view aft
along the tiles on the underside of the left wing at three seconds after liftoff The
origin of the debris was not seen but the debris may have originated from the
forward external tank area. This debris was not seen to contact the vehicle.
2.1.3.3 Debris at 12.8 and 18.4 Seconds MET
(Camera: ET207)
A single light colored piece of debris (possibly umbilical ice) fell aft of the body
flap during the roll maneuver (12.8 seconds MET). A single piece of light
colored debris first seen near the base of the RSRB fell aft of the SSME's into thc
SSME exhaust plume ( 18.4 seconds MET).
STS-67 JSC Summary Report A9

2. STS-67 (OV-105): Summary of Significant Events
2.1.3.4
2.1.3.5
Debris at 20.4 Seconds MET
(Camera: E59)
Several pieces of light colored debris were seen falling along the RSRB exhaust
plume at 20.4 seconds MET.
Debris at 39.5 Seconds MET
(Camera: E223)
Figure 2.1.3.5: Debris at 39.5 Seconds MET
Several pieces of light colored debris, first seen near the vertical stabilizer, were
seen at approximately 39.5 seconds MET. These pieces of debris were not seen to
contact the vehicle.
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2.1.3.6 Debris at 48.0 Seconds MET
(Cameras: KTV 13, ET208, ET212, E208, E212 and E220)
Figure 2,1.3.6: Trajectory of the Debris seen at 48 Seconds MET
A single piece of light colored debris (possibly ET/Orbiter purge barrier material),
first noted near the ET/Orbiter umbilicals, fell along the underside of the Orbiter
and was temporarily entrapped in the vehicle's turbulence (48 seconds MET).
The debris appeared to make contact with the aft end of the Orbiter on several of
the views. However, the Camera E212 view confirmed that the debris did not
contact the Orbiter. The debris broke into three pieces and fell aft into the SSME
exhaust plume.
2.1.3.7 Debris between 61 and 81 Seconds MET
(Cameras: KTV5 and KTV4A)
At least twenty pieces of light colored debris fell aft of the vehicle along the SRB
plume between 61 and 81 seconds MET. One of these pieces was seen on
KTV4A at 71 seconds MET. None of the debris appeared to strike the vehicle.
2.1.3.8 Debris Reported by the Crew (Task #10)
The transcript of the crew report on debris is as follows:
Capcom:
Endeavour, Houston: OBS will take a debris report if your able to see
anything on the ascent if you've got a moment.
Endeglpollr"
Standby just a second.
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Endeavour:
Houston, Endeavour: Obviously it's pretty dark going uphill, but looking
at the windscreen now, there's just a couple of .... oh, they look like paper
smudges, but nothing significant.
Capcom:
O.K., Endeavour we copy. Nothing significant on the windows.
Endeavour:
That' s affirmative.
MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORM (MLP) EVENTS
White Vapor near MLP at T-21 Seconds
(Cameras: OTV041, OTV048, OTV049, OTV060, OTV063, KTV4A, KTV7A,
KTV 11, KTV21A and ET213)
Figure 2.2.1: White Vapor near the RH SRB Aft Skirt at T-21 Seconds
White vapor was noted rising from the MLP area just to the east of the Shuttle
Launch Vehicle at approximately T-21 seconds. The vapor was first seen near the
RSRB aft skirt. KSC reported the white vapor to be smoke from the RH SRB
hydraulic power unit. No follow-up action was requested.
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2.2.2 Orange and Green Vapors
(Cameras: OTV063, OTV070, OTV071 and E36)
Figure 2.2.2: Orange and Green Vapors near the Vertical Stabilizer
during SSME Ignition
Orange and green vapors (possibly flee burning hydrogen) were seen curling
under the body flap and near the SSME bells at T-5 seconds. Orange vapors were
also seen near the vertical stabilizer. This event has been noted on past missions
and would be a concern if the vapors were seen near the ET/Orbiter umbilicals.
On this mission the vapors were below the umbilicals. No follow-up action was
requested.
s
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Base Heat Shield Erosion
(Camera: E 17)
2.2.4
2.2.5
Figure 2.2.3: Base Heat Shield Erosion
A small white area of base heat shield erosion was seen to form near tile base of
SSME #3 during SSME ignition (T-4.5 seconds). Base heal shield erosion has
been seen on previous missions. No fi)llow-up action was requested,
Base Heat Shield Motion
(Camera: E77)
Slight motion of the base heat shield was visible during SSME ignition near
SSME #3. Base heat shield motion has been seen on previous missions. No
follow-up action was requested.
White Line at Base of SSME #2
(Camera: E20)
A white line (possibly fiost) was observed between the base of SSME #2 and die
Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) during SSME ignition. A small white area
on the SSME #2 DMHS was also visible. The NSTS-08303 Ice/Debris Inspection
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2.2.6
Criteria Document states that: ice/frost formation on the engine mounted heat
shield may indicate tile pooling of liquid nitrogen on the interior side of the
shield. No follow-up action was requested.
RCS Paper Discoloration
(Camera: El 8)
2.2.7
Figure 2.2.6: RCS Paper Discoloration
The paper cover of the L3D RCS thruster was noted to be discolored at SSME
ignition. No follow-up action was requested.
Flashes in SSME Plumes after SSME Ignition
(Camera: E3 and El9)
A small white flash was seen in the SSME #I exhaust plume at 2.3 seconds prior
to liftoff. Flashes in the SSME exhaust plumes have been seen on prior missions.
No follow-up analysis was requested.
M_..i
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2.2.8 Rope Like Objects in SRB Flame Duct
(Camera: EIO)
Figure 2.2.8: Rope Like Objects in the SRB Flame Duct
Two long rope-like objects were seen in the SRB flame duct near the RSRB
holddown post M-3 at SRB ignition. No follow-up action was requested.
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ASCENT EVENTS
Body Flap Motion (Task #4)
Slight body flap motion was observed prior to liftoff and during ascent.
Photographic analysis of the body flap motion was performed. Table 2.3.1 is a
summary of the body flap motion measurements for STS-67.
Body Flap Motion
(max. measured)
Starboard Port side Frequency Camera
side (global)
On Launch Pad 0.6" 1.0" 8.5 Hz El7
During Ascent 6.5" 7.4" 9.0 Hz E212
v
Table 2.3.1: Measured Body Flap Motion on the Pad and during Ascent
2.3.1.1 Body Flap Motion on the Pad
(Camera: E17)
Several points defining the aft port and starboard edges of the body flap were
chosen on every fourth frame over a period of 400 frames for measurement. This
corresponds to approximately one second of the actual data. A control point on
the body flap thickness (assumed to lie in the plane of motion) was used as the
scaling factor for this analysis. The maximum peak-to-peak motion was measured
to be approximately 0.6 inches on starboard side and 1.0 inch on the port side.
A frequency-domain analysis revealed the existence of several specific modes of
vibration. Both the port and starboard sides revealed peaks at 8.5 Hz (global
rotation) and 25.5 Hz (lst bending). The port side also revealed peaks at 40.5 Hz
(2nd bending). This analysis is part of a long term trend analysis study on the
body flap motion.
2.3.1.2 Body Flap Motion During Ascent
(Camera E212)
Camera E212 provided the best view of body flap motion seen during ascent. A
subjective comparison between this mission and others since reflight indicated
slight motion on STS-67. Several points defining the aft port and starboard edges
of the body flap were chosen on every other frame over a period of 200 frames.
This corresponded to approximately three seconds of actual data. In addition, two
control points on the Orbiter fuselage were chosen to serve as a control for error
measurements. SSME bell diameters (in the plane of motion) were used as
scaling factors for this analysis. The maximum peak-to-peak motion was found to
be approximately 6.5 inches on the starboard side and 7.4 inches on the port side.
However, most of the measured motion can be attributed to the presence of the
noise in the data.
A frequency-domain analysis identified specific modes of vibration. Both the port
and starboard data revealed peaks at 9.0 Hz (global rotation), 14.5 Hz (torsion),
and 40.5 Hz (2nd bending). However, due to noise many of the higher
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2.3.2
2.3.3
2.3.4
frequencies could not be determined. No conclusive results could be obtained
from this analysis. The significance of the presence of different modes depends
upon the results of a long term trend analysis. Camera defocus problems,
atmospheric distortions and measurement errors affected the overall accuracy of
these results.
Flares in SSME Exhaust Plume
(Cameras: E57, E218, E222 and E223)
Several small light colored flares were seen in the SSME #I exhaust plume at 6.1,
25, 26, 40, and 41 seconds MET. Flares in the SSME exhaust plume have been
seen on previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
Linear Optical Effects
(Cameras: E212, E218 and KTV13)
Multiple linear optical effects were seen after the roll maneuver. Engineers at the
JSC have previously attributed this event to the manifestation of shock waves
around the SLV. No follow-up action was requested.
Recirculation (Task #1)
(Cameras: E204, E208, E212, E218, ET204, ET208 and KTV13)
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the Shuttle
Launch Vehicle (SLV) prior to SRB separation has been seen on nearly all
previous missions. For STS-67, the start of recirculation was observed at
approximately 92 seconds MET and the end was noted at approximately 112
seconds MET (E204). No follow-up action was requested.
ONBOARD PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE EXTERNAL TANK (DTO-312)
Analysis of the Handheld Photography of the ET (Task # 6)
During the External Tank (ET) separation, thirty seven pictures were taken by the
astronauts with a Nikon 35 mm camera using a 300 mm lens and 2x extender.
The exposure is good on all frames. The focus is good on most frames. Timing
data is present on the film. The first picture was taken on March 2, 1995 at
07:01:13.000 UTC (approximately 23 minutes after liftoff), and the last picture
was taken at 07:09:48.000 UTC. The ET appeared to be in good condition and all
aspects of the ET were imaged.
The ET was measured to be 3.1 km. from the Orbiter at the time of the first
picture and 6.1 km. from _e Orbiter at the time of the last picture. The separation
velocity was calculated to be 5.75 rn/sec. The average tumble rate of the ET was
measured to be 2.7 deg/sec, and the average roll rate was measured to be 10.8
deg/sec.
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2.4.2
(STS067-301-003)
Figure 2.4.1: Photograph of the External Tank with a Handheld 35 mm Camera
No anomalies were seen on the external tank. The aft dome charring and the
booster separation motor burn scars appear typical of previous missions.
Analysis of the Umbilical Well Camera (Task # 5)
The 16 mm LH2 Umbilical Well Film (using the 5 mm & 10 mm lenses) of the
SRB separation have good exposures and good focus. Timing data is present. The
umbilical well photography of the ET separation was underexposed and unusable
due to the night time conditions.
Numerous light colored pieces of debris (probably insulation) are visible
throughout the SRB film sequence. Typical chipping and erosion of the electric
cable tray are visible. Erosion and charring of the ETFLSRB aft attach is also
visible. A blistering of the fire barrier coating on the outboard side of the LH2
umbilical is apparent. These events are typical of those seen on previous mission
umbilical well camera views.
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Figure 2.4.2: Umbilical Well Photograph of Dark Debris
(16 mm Umbilical Well Camera with 5 mm Lens)
A large, dark, flat, rectangular shaped piece of debris was seen coming from
behind the electric cable tray prior to SRB separation (5 mm lens view, frame
410). Other, similar debris were seen coming from behind the electric cable tray
before SRB separation (5 mm lens view, frames 373 and 602).
ORIGINAL PAGE
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LANDING EVENTS
Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3)
The main gear sink rate of the Orbiter was determined over a one second time
period prior to main gear touchdown. Also, the nose gear sink rate was
determined over a one second time period prior to the nose gear touchdown.
The measured main gear and nose gear sink rate values were found to be below
the maximum allowable values of 9.6 ft/sec for a 211,000 lb. vehicle and 6.0
ft/sec for a 240,000 lb. vehicle (the landing weight of the STS-67 Orbiter was
reported to be 217,450 lb.). The sink rate measurements for the STS-67 are given
in Table 2.5.1. In Figures 2.5.1 (A) and 2.5.1 03) the trend of the measured data
points for both film camera image data and video image data are illustrated.
Prior to Touchdown (1 sec) Sink Rate: Film Sink Rate: Video
Main Gear 3.11 ft/sec 3.22 ft/sec
Nose Gear 3.74 ft/sec 3.77 ft/sec
Table 2.5.1: Sink Rate Measurements
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Figure 2.5.1 (A): Main Gear Sink Rate from Film (E1035) and Video (LRO2)
V
"_ 3.5
u 3
¢
2.5
o
"_ 2,u
" 1.5'
_ 1
_ 0.5
STS-67: Nose gear sink rate
(shown as trend of the data points)4
i;
film
0 I
-I -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0
Time relative to touchdown (seconds)
Figure 2.5.1 (13): Nose Gear Sink Rate from Film (E1005) and Video (DTV2)
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2.5.2 Drag Chute Performance (Task #9)
(Cameras: DTV3 and El005).
The performance of the drag chute during rollout of STS-67 appeared normal.
The drag chute has been taken off the Detailed Test Objective (DTO) status
beginning with STS-63. For future missions, the drag chute angular orientation
will only be measured upon special request.
Event Description Time (UTC) Camera
Drag Chute Initiation
Pilot Chute Inflation
Drag Chute - Reefed
Drag Chute - Disreefed
Drag Chute Release
077:21:47:16.050
077:21:47:16.888
077:21:47:19.620
077:21:47:22.700
077:21:47:43.010
El005
DTV3
El005
El005
El005
Table 2.5.2: Drag Chute Event Times
O,_tGTNAL PAGE
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Figure 2.5.2: Dark Objects on the Drag Chute Lines
Several small dark objects (possibly abrasion prevention material) were seen on
the drag chute lines during the landing roiiout at 21:47:43.701 UTC.
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2.5.3 Orbiter Height above Threshold (Task #13)
The height of the Orbiter above the threshold at landing for the STS-67 mission
was not determined. The technique for this measurement requires that a camera
with a perpendicular view of the runway at the threshold location be used for the
analysis. This view is currently only available for landings at KSC.
OTHER
Normal Events
Other normal events observed include: ice buildup on the SSME vent nozzles,
normal SSME ignition sequence, RCS paper debris at SSME ignition, slight vapor
from the gaseous oxygen (GOX) vent on the ET, frost on the ET vent louvers, ET
twang, ice and vapor from the ground umbilical carrier plate (GUCP), left inboard
and outboard elevon motion at liftoff, slight vertical stabilizer motion at liftoff,
contrails from the Orbiter wing tips after liftoff, acoustic waves at liftoff, debris in
the exhaust cloud at the pad after liftoff, RCS paper debris prior to and after
liftoff, ET aft dome outgassing and vapor from the SRB stiffener rings after
liftoff, expansion waves, SRB plume brightening, slag debris in the SRB exhaust
plume before, during, and after SRB separation.
Normal events related to the pad are hydrogen ignitor operation, fixed service
structure (FSS) deluge water spray activation, GH2 vent arm retraction, LH2
TSM door closure, sound suppression water initiation, mobile launch platform
(MLP) water dump activation.
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2.6.2 Terminal Events and Timing (Task #11)
A detailed timeline of the SSME and SRB ignition sequences is as follows:
Event Description Time (-UTC) Camera
",,._..j
NW Hydrogen ignitor start
SE Hydrogen ignitor start
SW Hydrogen ignitor start
SSME #3 white stream
SSME #3 yellow fire
SSME #3 mach diamond
SSME #2 white stream
SSME #2 yellow fire
SSME #2 mach diamond
SSME #1 white stream
SSME #1 yellow fire
SSME #1 mach diamond
L02 TSM T-0 disconnect
LH2 TSM T-0 disconnect
HDP #1 PIC fh-ing
HDP #2 PIC firing
HDP #3 PIC fu'ing
HDP #5 PIC f'Ldng
HDP #6 PIC firing
HDP #7 PIC firing
HDP #8 PIC firing
061:06:38:03.385 KTV7
061:06:38:03.419 KTV7
061:06:38:03.357 E19
061:06:38:06.979 El9
061:06:38:07.975 El9
061:06:38:09.790 El9
061:06:38:07.082 E20
061:06:38:08.113 E20
061:06:38:09.818 E20
061:06:38:07.189 El9
061:06:38:08.221 El9
061:06:38:09.940 El9
061:06:38:13.154 El7
061:06:38:13.158 El8
061:06:38:12.998 E9
061:06:38:12.998 E8
061:06:38:12.999 El0
061:06:38:12.999 El2
061:06:38:13.002 El3
061:06:38:13.000 Ell
061:06:38:13.004 El4
Table 2.6.1: Terminal events timing
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I. INTRODUCTION
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-67, the eighth
flight of the Orbiter Endeavour occurred on March 2, 1995, at
approximately 1:38 A.M. Eastern Standard Time from Launch
Complex 39A (LC-39A), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida.
Extensive photographic and video coverage exists and has
been evaluated to determine proper operation of the ground and
flight hardware. Cameras (video and cine) providing this
coverage are located on the fixed service structure (FSS),
mobile launch platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard
the vehicle, and uprange and downrange tracking sites.
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES:
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis
objectives for STS-67 included, but were not limited to the
following:
a. Overall facility and shuttle vehicle coverage for
anomaly detection
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems
c. Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB
separation time
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS)
integrity
e. Correct operation of the following:
i. Holddownpost blast covers
2. SSME ignition
3. LH2 and LO2 17" disconnects
4. GH2 umbilical
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals
6. Free hydrogen ignitors
7. Vehicle clearances
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch'back
9. Vehicle motion
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT:
Film was received from fifty-two of fifty-three requested
cameras as well as video from twenty-four of twenty-four
requested cameras. The following table illustrates the camera
data received at MSFC for STS-67.
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MLP
FSS
Perimeter
Tracking
Onboard
Camera data received at MSFC
for STS-67
16mm 35mm Video
22 0 4
7 0 3
3 2 6
0 15 11
2 1 0
Totals 34 18 24
Total number of films and videos received: 76
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a. Ground Camera Coverage:
The night launch reduces the amount of date from all
cameras. All cameras operated properly except camera E-62 which
did not run. Timing information was not available on camera
E-213.
b. Onboard Camera Coverage:
The astronauts recorded 37 frames using a hand-held camera.
The images were of good quality showing all sides of the ET
after separation. Films were received from the two umbilical
well 16mm cameras. No images of the ET separation were recorded
due to the night launch.
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS:
a. General Observations:
While viewing the film, several events were noted which
occur on most missions. These events consist of ice/frost
falling from the 17 inch disconnects during SSME ignition and
launch, small pieces of debris such as butcher paper and paper
hydrogen fire detectors falling aft during ascent, debris
induced streaks/flares in the SSME plumes, glowing debris
particles exiting the SRM plumes and slag from the SRM's prior
to and during SRB separation.
There were no indications of a holddown post stud hang-up
or debris from the explosive bolt fragments.
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The film from the on-board hand-held camera showed no
divots or anomalies on the ET TPS surface. The ET appeared to
be in excellent condition.
Frost was observed around the eyelid on ME-2 prior to
liftoff as shown in Figure one which was taken from camera E-20.
Frost of this type has been observed on previous missions (STS-
38, STS-62, STS-63).
Figure 1 Frost on eyelid of ME-2 prior to liftoff
A bright line was noted on the inside nozzle wall of engine
1 as shown in Figure two. This engine has been previously flown
on the following missions:
STS-68 abort 1
STS-60 1
STS-52 1
STS-44 2
STS-30R 2
STS-27R 2
Films from these missions have been reviewed. The line is
visible in each film. On the earliest launches the line was dim
and has become brighter and more visible on the later missions.
This information has been forwarded to the design engineers for
further analysis.
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Figure 2 Bright line in nozzle of ME-1
A piece of ice was observed falling over the right orbiter
wing at approximately T+5 seconds MET as recorded by camera E-
57. The ice debris does not impact the vehicle. The source of
this ice is most likely the upper LOX feedline bellows.
The ME-1 mach diamond flashes orange for one film frame
(0.01 second or less) during ascent at approximately T+25
seconds MET as recorded by cameras E-222 and E-213. Figure
three shows this flash as recorded by camera E-222. This type
of flash has been observed on previous missions (STS-43, STS-46,
and STS-49 FRF).
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Figure 3 ME-1 mach diamond flashes orange
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LSeveral debris induced streaks were observed in the SSME
plumes during ascent. Figures four and five show typical debris
induced streaks as recorded by camera E-218.
Figure 4 Typical debris induced streak in SSME plume as recorded
by camera E-218
Figure 5 Another view of a typical debris induced streak in the
SSME plume
Purge barrier material from the 17 inch disconnects was
noted falling aft of the vehicle at T+48 seconds MET as recorded
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by several tracking cameras. This event is depicted in Figure
six as observed by camera E-212 and Figure seven as observed by
camera E-218. Purge barrier material typically falls off during
this portion of flight but the lighting conditions made this
event very noticeable.
Figure 6 Purge barrier material falling from vehicle at T+48
seconds as recorded by camera E-212
Figure 7 Purge barrier material falling from vehicle as recorded
by camera E-218
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Figure eight is a frame of video from camera TV-5 showing
glowing debris from the SRM plumes. On this mission a large
amount of this debris was noted between T+61 seconds and 85
seconds MET. Also, rope-like debris particles were observed
falling from the SRM plumes during ascent as shown in Figure
nine which was taken from camera E-218. Typically, these debris
particles are more visible during night time launches due to
their contrast with the night sky.
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Figure 8 Glowing debris from SRM plume
Figure 9 Rope-like debris exiting from SRM plume
ORIGINAL PAGE
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
B-IO
V
V. ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS:
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a. T-Zero Times:
T-Zero times are determined from cameras that view the SRB
holddown posts numbers M-l, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras
record the explosive bolt combustion products.
HOLDDOWN POST CAMERA POSITION TIME (UTC)
M-I E-9
M-2 E-8
M-5 E-12
M-6 E-13
061:06:38:12.998
061:06.:38:13.001
061:06:38:12.999
061:06:38:12.997
b. ET Tip Deflection:
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was measured to
be approximately 31 inches. Figure ten is a data plot showing
the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal and
vertical directions. A positive horizontal displacement
represents motion in the -Z direction. These data were derived
from film camera E-79A.
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c. SRB Separation Time:
SRB separation time for STS-67 was determined to be
061:06:40:18.05 UTC as recorded by tracking camera E-212.
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